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Abstract—X-ray imagery security screening is essential to
maintaining transport security against a varying profile of threat
or prohibited items. Particular interest lies in the automatic de-
tection and classification of weapons such as firearms and knives
within complex and cluttered X-ray security imagery. Here, we
address this problem by exploring various end-to-end object
detection Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) architectures.
We evaluate several leading variants spanning the Faster R-
CNN, Mask R-CNN, and RetinaNet architectures to explore the
transferability of such models between varying X-ray scanners
with differing imaging geometries, image resolutions and material
colour profiles. Whilst the limited availability of X-ray threat
imagery can pose a challenge, we employ a transfer learning
approach to evaluate whether such inter-scanner generalisation
may exist over a multiple class detection problem. Overall, we
achieve maximal detection performance using a Faster R-CNN
architecture with a ResNet101 classification network, obtaining
0.88 and 0.86 of mean Average Precision (mAP) for a three-class
and two class item from varying X-ray imaging sources. Our
results exhibit a remarkable degree of generalisability in terms
of cross-scanner performance (mAP: 0.87, firearm detection:
0.94 AP). In addition, we examine the inherent adversarial
discriminative capability of such networks using a specifically
generated adversarial dataset for firearms detection - with a
variable low false positive, as low as 5%, this shows both the
challenge and promise of such threat detection within X-ray
security imagery.
Index Terms—X-ray imagery, deep convolutional neural net-
works, object detection, classification, transferability.
I. INTRODUCTION
X-ray security screening is widely used to maintain aviation,
border, and transport security. To facilitate effective screening,
threat detection via scanned X-ray imagery is increasingly
employed to provide a non-intrusive, internal view of scanned
baggage, freight, and postal items, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
This produces colour-mapped X-ray images which correspond
to the material properties detected via the dual-energy X-ray
scanning process. Within this context, the term threat refers
to a prohibited item such as firearms, bladed weapons, or con-
cealed explosives, etc. In recent years, the rapid development
of deep learning has brought new insight to the automation of
this X-ray imagery screening task [1], [2], where the primary
task is both to localise and classify the prohibited item as it
appears in the image. Therefore, in this paper, we extend the
current trend of using end-to-end deep learning architectures
BA
Fig. 1. Exemplar X-ray baggage imagery with prohibited items inside (red
box): (A) Firearm and (B) Knife.
used for this task by performing an extended evaluation
of such frameworks on large-scale X-ray security imagery.
Denoted as Dbf3 [2] and SIXray [3] datasets from varying
X-ray scanners, we aim to provide an insight into baseline
performance for several CNN architectural variants following
the work of [2]. For this study, we limit our discussion to the
detection of firearms (i.e. firearms and firearms with additional
parts) and sharp objects (i.e. knives) as the prohibited objects.
In addition, we consider a third dataset, denoted DAD, to
specifically investigate the discriminative capability of such
networks against generic adversarial objects, manufactured to
have global shape properties similar to that of a prohibited
item whilst remaining benign in nature. Subsequently, the main
contributions of this paper are:
• an exploration of three end-to-end CNN-based object de-
tection architectures with varying network configuration
for addressing prohibited item detection in X-ray imagery
security, expanding the work of [2]–[4].
• an evaluation of the inter-scanner transferability of such
trained CNN models in terms of their generalizaton across
varying X-ray scanner characteristics.
• an appraisal the trained CNN models for prohibited item
discrimination against a dataset of specific adversarial ob-
jects, whose global shape characteristics closely resemble
those of a firearm within X-ray imagery.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, scope of the literature review here is limited
to prohibited item classification and detection, presented in the
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following subsections:
Object Classification in X-ray Security Imagery: Early work
within X-ray security imagery primarily utilises handcrafted
features, where a bag of visual words (BoVW) and Support
Vector Machine (SVM) are applied for feature extraction and
classification, respectively [5] [6]. Mery et al. [7] propose
a method to recognise prohibited items in multiple view X-
ray imagery by filtering out false positive from monocular
detection performed on single views, then match it with
multiple views. A BoVW approach is further employed in [6]
by exploring various feature point descriptors as visual word
variants within a BoVW model achieving 94.0% accuracy
for two-class firearm detection with SVM classification. The
work of [1] first introduce the use of CNN to address object
classification task by comparing varying CNN architectures to
the earlier work extensive BoVW of [6]. Leveraging the use of
transfer learning, [1] shows that CNN architectures outperform
BoVW features, by achieving 98.92% detection accuracy in
firearm classification. Following [1], Mery et al. [4] compares
handcrafted features BoVW, sparse representation, codebooks
with deep learning features. Consistent with the results in [1],
deep features achieve higher results with more than 95% accu-
racy in the detection of a threat. More recently, the work on [2]
exhaustively compares various CNN architectures to evaluate
the impact of network complexity on overall performance. Fine
tuning the entire network architecture for this problem domain
yields 0.996% true positive, 0.011% false positive and 0.994%
accuracy for prohibited item detection.
Object Detection in X-ray Security Imagery: Extensive
experiments on object detection is conducted by Franzel et al.
[8], where they adapt appearance-based object class detection
in multiple view X-ray imagery. Multi-view detection is shown
to provide superior detection performance compared with
single-view detection for handguns, with mAP of 0.645. With
the recent development of object detection approach, [2] ex-
amines the relative performance of traditional sliding window
[8], [9] against contemporary region-based CNN variants in
X-ray security imagery [10]–[13]. The work of [2] reports
the performance of a traditional sliding window driven CNN
detection model based on [1] against contemporary region-
based and single forward-pass based CNN variants such as
Faster R-CNN [10], R-FCN [11], and YOLOv2 [12] achieving
a maximal 0.885 and 0.974 mAP over 6-class object detection
and 2-class firearm detection problems respectively. Overall,
[2] illustrates the real-time applicability and superiority of
such integrated region based detection models within an X-ray
security imagery context. Here we follow up on this theme,
with our evaluation of the generalisation of such models by
evaluating their inter-scanner transferability and discriminative
capability against specific physical adversarial objects.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
We extend the capability of contemporary region based
CNN variants by incorporating Faster R-CNN [10], Mask R-
CNN [14] and RetinaNet [15] as our prohibited item detection
approach.
Faster R-CNN: Prohibited item detection within X-ray secu-
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Fig. 2. Common End-to-End CNN based prohibited item detection architec-
ture with RPN backbone.
rity imagery using Faster R-CNN were first introduced in [2],
where it is trained with various network architectures such
as AlexNet [16], VGG [17] and ResNet [18]. By adding a
unique region proposal network (RPN) on top of the original
Fast R-CNN architecture [13], it manages efficient prediction
of object bounding box localization.
Mask R-CNN: Following the work in [2], which builds upon
Faster R-CNN in X-ray security imagery, we augment this
model by adding convolutional layers to construct an object
boundary segmentation mask, following the Mask R-CNN
concept of [14]. It is performed by adding an additional branch
to Faster R-CNN that outputs an additional image mask indi-
cating pixel membership of a given detected object. Mask R-
CNN also addresses feature map misalignment, found in Faster
R-CNN [10] for higher resolution feature map boundaries, via
bi-linear boundary interpolation.
RetinaNet: RetinaNet is based on a single stage detector, which
involves Focal-Loss to address class imbalance issue caused by
extreme foreground-background ratio [15]. In terms of X-ray
security imagery, the task of identifying small metal prohibited
items such as a knives presents a notable challenge due to both
their size characteristics and shape overlap within the general
clutter of X-ray security imagery itself. Therefore, RetinaNet
is considered as it offers faster processing speed and higher
accuracy for small object detection, when compared to YOLO
[12], thanks its unique Feature Pyramid Network (FPN) and
Focal Loss function characteristics.
Within the X-ray imagery security domain, data may be
sourced from varying equipment, with different imaging pa-
rameters, X-ray energy spectra and spatial resolution [19],
[20], [21]. Related work on the transferability of trained CNN
models between varying X-ray scanner equipment is addressed
by the work of [22], in which they focus on transfer learning
between two extremities of the X-ray screening domain in
terms of scale - cargo and parcel scanning (which use very
different X-ray scanner equipment due to the differences in
scale). From the work of [22], the two key issues identified
in transferring knowledge across such X-ray domains are: (a)
the limited availability of object of interest (prohibited item)
examples, and (b) X-ray threat images appear in a different
machines with very different imaging characteristcs. In this
work we address a similar transferability problem between X-
ray scanner equipment but within the same domain (and scale)
of baggage/parcel X-ray security screening.
Our hypothesis is that a CNN model trained on a given
X-ray security image dataset, gathered solely from a discrete
X-ray scanner in terms of manufacturer/model, will be capable
of exhibiting a high degree of generalisation in terms of
performance to other such datasets gathered from varying
X-ray scanner configuration (varying manufacturers/models).
Here, we focus on two datasets which come from different X-
ray scanners. Denoted as Dbf3 [2] and SIXray [3], the former
dataset is from a Smith Detection X-ray scanner [21] whilst
the later comes from a Nuctech scanner [20]. In addition,
Dbf3 is focused solely upon passenger carry-on baggage
within an aviation security context whilst SIXray is based
on security screening within a metro transit system context.
In order to investigate cross-scanner generalisation and hence
transferability, our set of CNN end-to-end models are trained
using on each dataset in turn and then evaluated on the other.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Our experimental setup comprises of three different datasets
and a common CNN training environment. As for training
details, we follow same environment as in [23].
A. X-ray Image Datasets
Our evaluation comprises three varying X-ray security im-
agery datasets:
Dbf3. The X-ray security imagery from Durham Dataset Full
Three-class (Dbf3) are generated using a Smith Detection dual-
energy X-ray scanner. This dataset was generated using three
types metallic prohibited items, where it consists of 3,192
images of firearms, 1,204 images of firearms parts, 3,207
images of knives. Each object are emplaced in a representative
and varied set of test bags which cover the full dimensions of
aviation cabin baggage (Fig. 3A).
SIXray10. We use SIXray dataset [3] for prohibited item
discovery in X-ray security images. It consists of 1, 059, 231
X-ray images, in which six classes of 8, 929 prohibited items.
These images are collected using a Nuctech dual-energy X-ray
scanner, where the distribution of the general baggage/parcel
items corresponds to stream-of-commerce occurrence. We use
a subset of the SIXray dataset, SIXray10, which consists of five
classes of prohibited items. In our experiments, we incorporate
5,083 images from two classes, 3,130 images of firearms and
1,953 images of knives, depicted in Fig. 3B.
DAD. Durham Adversarial Dataset (DAD) is constructed using
Gilardoni dual-energy X-ray scanner (FEP ME 640 AMX), in
the same manner as Dbf3 but with artificially manufactured
imitation objects, that have global shape characteristics similar
to a firearm emplaced into various baggage items. These
adversarial discriminative objects are L-shaped metal objects
that within X-ray imagery may resemble a firearm as depicted
in Figs. 3C(1) → 3C(2). This dataset consists of 200 images of
imitation (adversarial) prohibited items and 200 images of real
prohibited items {firearms, knifes}. This dataset is created for
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Fig. 3. Exemplar X-ray baggage images with threat objects in the purple
box (1. Firearm, 2. Firearm parts, 3. Knife) from dataset (A) Dbf3 and (B)
SIXray10. In dataset DAD (C), the adversarial non-threat objects (C(1)), such
as different shape metal objects (in purple box), are placed inside bags (C(2)).
evaluation purposes, to test the discriminative capability of the
trained CNN model as to whether it can distinguish between
real and imitation of prohibited items.
V. EVALUATION
In our evaluation, we consider two tasks related to prohib-
ited item detection: (a) model generalisation across varying
X-ray imagery datasets (Section V-B) and (b) model discrim-
ination for adversarial threat objects that exhibit similar shape
characteristics to the real threat objects in the same dataset.
A. Evaluation Criteria
For detection, the performance of the models is evaluated by
mean average precision (mAP), as used in the seminal object
detection benchmark work of [24]. We consider mean Average
Precision (mAP) as our evaluation criteria following [23]. For
the classification, our model performances are evaluated in
terms of Accuracy (A), Precision (P), Recall (R), F-score
(F1%), True Positive (TP%), and False Positive (FP%) which
are calculated by thresholding (> 0.7) the intersection over
union for detection.
B. Performance
Performance on the prohibited item detection task is carried
out by comparing performance benchmark for these CNN
models against prior work [2]. Here, we present a set of
intra-domain results (Section V-B1, images from the same
scanner dataset used for training and evaluation) against our
transferablity evaluation inter-domain results (Section V-B2,
images from differing scanner datasets used for training and
evaluation).
1) Intra-domain Results: To provide reference performance
measures, our CNN models are firstly trained and evaluated
on the same dataset (i.e. Dbf3 ⇒ Dbf3 and SIXray10 ⇒
SIXray10) in this set of experiments. Table I shows prohibited
item detection results for Faster R-CNN [10], Mask R-CNN
[14] and RetinaNet [15] with varying network configurations
of ResNet. We observe that the best performance (mAP =
TABLE I
DETECTION RESULTS CNN MODELS ON TWO DATASETS. UPPER: TRAINED AND EVALUATED ON Dbf3 WITH THREE CLASSES. LOWER: TRAINED AND
EVALUATED ON SIXray10 WITH TWO CLASSES. CLASS NAME REFLECTS CORRESPONDING AVERAGE PRECISION (AP) FOR THE INDIVIDUAL OBJECT
CLASS AND MAP IS THE MEAN AVERAGE PRECISION ACROSS ALL OBJECT CLASSES.
Train ⇒
Evaluation Model
Network
configuration
Average precision mAPFirearm Firearm Parts Knives
Dbf3 ⇒
Dbf3
Faster R-CNN [10] ResNet50 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.82ResNet101 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.88
Mask R-CNN [14] ResNet50 0.86 0.83 0.75 0.81ResNet101 0.89 0.86 0.80 0.85
RetinaNet [15] ResNet50 0.88 0.86 0.73 0.82ResNet101 0.89 0.86 0.73 0.83
SIXray10 ⇒
SIXray10
Faster R-CNN [10] ResNet50 0.87 – 0.77 0.82ResNet101 0.91 – 0.81 0.86
Mask R-CNN [14] ResNet50 0.87 – 0.77 0.82ResNet101 0.89 – 0.79 0.84
RetinaNet [15] ResNet50 0.91 – 0.79 0.85ResNet101 0.92 – 0.79 0.86
TABLE II
DETECTION RESULTS OF CNN MODELS ON INTER-DOMAIN DATASETS. UPPER: MODELS ARE TRAINED ON Dbf3 AND EVALUATED ON SIXray10. LOWER:
MODELS ARE TRAINED ON SIXray10 AND EVALUATED ON Dbf3.
Train ⇒
Evaluation Model
Network
configuration
Average precision mAPFirearm Knives
Dbf3 ⇒
SIXray10
Faster R-CNN [10] ResNet101 0.89 0.80 0.85
Mask R-CNN [14] ResNet101 0.85 0.77 0.81
RetinaNet [15] ResNet101 0.89 0.77 0.83
SIXray10 ⇒
Dbf3
Faster R-CNN [10] ResNet101 0.94 0.88 0.91
Mask R-CNN [14] ResNet101 0.86 0.72 0.79
RetinaNet [15] ResNet101 0.87 0.66 0.76
0.88) is achieved on Dbf3 by Faster R-CNN with ResNet101
configuration, as presented in the upper part of Table I.
Although Mask R-CNN and RetinaNet perform reasonably
well for class firearm and firearm parts, these models perform
less well on the knives class.
The firearm parts class is absent from the SIXray10 dataset
(as denoted in Table I). On the remaining two classes in
the SIXray10 dataset, the Faster R-CNN with RestNet101
configuration outperformed other configuration with mAP =
0.86. As reported in the work of [3], the highest achieved
AP for the class firearm, is 90.64% with ResNet50. However,
our model, RetinaNet with RestNet101, produces a marginally
superior AP = 0.92. The mAP results obtained for firearm
detection in general are in-line with those reported in the work
of [2]. Overall, the class knives does not perform well and this
is likely to be attributable to data imbalance in the image set
used for training in addition to the greater semantic difficulty
in separating this item from the background clutter.
2) Inter-domain Results: This evaluation is to assess the
CNN model performance across the X-ray security imagery
from differing scanner sources. We use the Dbf3 and SIXray10
datasets from varying X-ray scanners (as described in Section
IV-A). The models are trained on one dataset and evaluated on
other dataset, within which the X-Ray images are generated
from a different X-ray scanner (i.e. with differing energy,
geometry, resolution and colour profiles). Two sets of exper-
iments are carried out:- firstly the models are trained using
Dbf3 and evaluated on the imagery from SIXray10 (Table II
- Dbf3 ⇒ SIXray10) and secondly the inverse configuration,
(i.e. SIXray10 is used for training and images from Dbf3 for
Faster R­CNN
A   B
Faster R­CNN
Mask R­CNN Mask R­CNN
RetinaNet RetinaNet
Fig. 4. Exemplar of multiple prohibited item detection for the inter-domain
X-ray security training and evaluation configurations: (A) Dbf3 ⇒ SIXray10
and (B) SIXray10 ⇒ Dbf3 with varying CNN models.
evaluation, Table II - SIXray10 ⇒ Dbf3). AP/mAP is used for
performance measurement for comparison as shown in Table
II. We observe that for configuration Dbf3 ⇒ SIXray10, a
maximal mAP of 0.85 is achieved with Faster R-CNN, as
presented in the upper part of Table II. Although, RetinaNet
performs equally promising for the firearm class, for the
other class (knives) and globally, Faster R-CNN produces
superior accuracy. In general, AP of the class knives suffers
across the models due to the variation in the shape of these
objects between the datasets (Figs. 3A/B). Detection results on
the SIXray10 dataset, model training performed on the Dbf3
dataset (i.e Dbf3 ⇒ SIXray10) are depicted in Fig. 4A. Results
for the reverse configuration, SIXray10 ⇒ Dbf3, are presented
in the lower part of Table II where we observe the maximally
performing model is Faster R-CNN with 0.91 mAP and the
best AP (= 0.94) for the firearm class. Detection results on
TABLE III
STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF VARYING CNN ARCHITECTURES ON Dbf3 AND SIXray10 DATASETS (AVERAGED ACROSS ALL PROHIBITED ITEM CLASSES).
Model Network Dbf3 ⇒ Dbf3 SIXray10 ⇒ SIXray10configuration A P F1 TP FP A P F1 TP FP
Faster
R-CNN [10]
ResNet50 99.87 100.00 99.80 99.60 0.00 99.07 99.68 99.12 98.57 0.36
ResNet101 99.96 100.00 99.93 99.87 0.00 99.83 99.68 99.84 100.00 0.36
Mask
R-CNN [14]
ResNet50 99.94 99.82 99.91 100.00 0.09 98.65 99.68 98.72 97.78 0.36
ResNet101 99.93 99.78 99.89 100.00 0.11 99.66 99.68 99.68 99.68 0.36
RetinaNet [15] ResNet50 97.20 100.00 95.62 91.60 0.00 90.88 100.00 90.62 82.86 0.00ResNet101 97.25 100.00 95.69 91.74 0.00 90.96 99.81 90.74 83.17 0.18
TABLE IV
STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF VARYING CNN ARCHITECTURE FOR non-threat vs threat CLASSIFICATION ON DAD DATASET.
Model Network Dbf3 ⇒ DAD SIXray10 ⇒ DADconfiguration A P F1 TP FP A P F1 TP FP
Faster
R-CNN [10]
ResNet50 82.20 79.53 82.41 85.50 20.95 82.63 87.01 80.24 74.44 10.00
ResNet101 84.75 87.57 84.16 81.00 11.50 76.75 86.39 73.20 63.50 10.00
Mask
R-CNN [14]
ResNet50 77.75 80.33 76.76 73.50 18.00 76.50 89.55 71.86 60.00 07.00
ResNet101 83.75 86.49 83.12 80.00 12.50 78.50 83.93 76.63 70.50 13.50
RetinaNet [15] ResNet50 78.22 80.11 77.20 74.50 18.14 68.75 88.66 57.91 43.00 05.50ResNet101 79.73 82.05 81.01 80.00 20.59 67.75 89.01 55.67 40.50 05.00
the Dbf3 dataset, whilst model training is performed on the
SIXray10 dataset are depicted in Fig. 4A. As anticipated, the
knives class suffers from relatively low AP for both Mask R-
CNN and RetinaNet due to the variation in visual appearance
in between training and evaluation sets for this particular class
(Fig. 4 A/B). In the training data, the knives are mostly placed
on/under electronic items; however, the evaluation set consists
of very differing shapes of knives across a diverse background.
Overall, CNN models trained with the SIXray10 dataset offers
superior performance when compared to when the models are
trained with Dbf3 - even when evaluated on Dbf3. As a result,
we can infer that although images are from differing X-ray
scanners, the transferability of learnt CNN models is viable in
terms of maintaining prohibited item detection performance
over varying X-ray imagery sources.
C. Adversarial Discriminative Objects
Furthermore, we evaluate the discriminative capability of
the CNN-based detection models we consider (Section III),
trained for multiple class object detection (as per Table I,
when tested against both real threat objects and imitation
(adversarial) non-threat objects that have the same global
shape and material characteristics as the real threat objects.
Our test dataset for this task, DAD, is fully described in the
Section IV-A. To provide an initial benchmark for performance
without such adversarial examples, detection results for the
three-class prohibited item problem with the Dbf3 dataset and
two-class threat problem within the Sixray10 dataset, averaged
across all object classes, are presented in Table III (calculated
as per Section V-A). Here we can observe performance such
that all of the models considered consistently offer very low
false positive (FP) complimented by a high true positive (TP)
detection across both problems (see Table III).
To establish the impact of introducing adversarial examples,
we make use of the DAD dataset (Section IV-A) containing
our imitation (adversarial) threat-like objects, constructed as
a series of simple L-shaped metal brackets, mimicking the
real shape of firearms, firearm parts or knives within X-ray
security imagery depending on the angle of view (see Fig.
3C). In order to illustrate the impact of these examples, on
overall detection performance we introduce a global ’threat
vs. non-threat’ detection problem on the basis that the DAD
dataset (Section IV-A) has a 50/50 split between X-ray
security images containing a genuine threat object belonging
to the set {firearm, firearm parts, knives} and benign (non-
threat) images containing our imitation (adversarial) threat-
like objects. All genuine threat and (non-threat) adversarial
objects are set amongst regular benign baggage clutter. This
gives rise to a simple two-class meta-problem of ’threat vs.
non-threat’ by combining true positive detection for any of
the set {firearm, firearm parts, knives} in the genuine threat
object images as the class threat and conversely defining false
positives as detection for any of these objects within the benign
(non-threat) images that have the imitation (adversarial) threat-
like objects present.
As per the results of the performance benchmark shown in
Table III, we evaluate the same CNN models trained on each of
the Dbf3 and SIXray10 datasets and evaluate on DAD dataset
for this two-class meta-problem, {threat, non-threat} (Table
IV). With a Dbf3 trained model, Faster R-CNN with ResNet101
achieves maximal performance with the lowest FP (11.50%)
and accuracy of (84.75%) (Table IV). However, Faster R-CNN
with ResNet50 has maximal TP (85.50%), yet significantly
higher FP. Conversely, the lowest FP (5%) is achieved by
RetinaNet with ResNet101 with a SIXray10 trained model but
this model suffers from very low TP (40.5%). The Mask R-
CNN produces 7% FP with reasonable accuracy of 78.5%.
By comparing the performance of these models, under both
standard conditions (benchmark performance in Table III) and
adverserial conditions (Table IV), we can immediately see the
impact of the adversarial threat-like imitators as the models
get confused by the L-shaped imitation objects and wrongly
classifies them as threat objects (Fig. 5). This clearly illus-
trates the challenge posed by such physical adversarial object
examples within achieving viable performance for automated
BA
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Fig. 5. Exemplar where CNN threat detection falsely detect L-shaped metal
item as threat item when the models (Faster R-CNN: row.1, Mask R-CNN:
row.2 and RetinaNet: row.3) are trained on (A) Dbf3 and (B) SIXray10 dataset.
X-ray security image classification.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the transferability and adversarial dis-
crimination of various end-to-end object detection Convo-
lutional Neural Network (CNN) architectures for prohibited
item detection within X-ray security imagery. Faster R-CNN
achieves superior baseline performance (0.86/0.88 mAP) over
a three class prohibited item detection problem (objects:
firearms, firearm parts, knives) evaluated on two disparate
datasets capturing with varying X-ray image scanner equip-
ment. Furthermore, we directly evaluate transferability of such
CNN model performance by employing cross-scanner valida-
tion to ascertain inter-scanner generalisation performance. We
show that a CNN model trained on X-ray security imagery
exclusively from one X-ray scanner manufacturer’s device and
then performance tested exclusively on separate X-ray security
imagery from another manufacturer’s scanner will produce
strong generalisation performance despite differences in the X-
ray image characteristics (0.85/0.91 mAP, two class problem -
firearms, knives). This provides strong insight to the generali-
sation capability of the proposed method across varying X-ray
imagery characteristics. Finally, we appraise the performance
of such trained CNN models against physically constructed ad-
versarial examples (imitation threat items). Whilst this shows a
clear impact on generalised performance from the use of such
adversarial object, it additionally illustrates the possibility of a
false positive rate as low as 5% remains under such conditions.
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